TSMC has hit a new milestone, and it’s not a small one. Now valued at roughly US$1.7 trillion, the semiconductor powerhouse has climbed past major global names to become the world’s sixth-largest company. For Taiwan, that surge is a point of pride—and also a trigger for fresh debate at home about what comes next as TSMC expands further into the United States.
In the wake of recently concluded US–Taiwan trade talks, some critics in Taiwan have raised a sharp concern: could deeper cooperation with the United States lead to a “brain drain,” pulling top semiconductor engineers and key know-how away from Taiwan? Skeptics argue Taiwan may be giving up too much—especially if the outcome is preferential treatment for other sectors such as machine tools, traditional industries, and products related to Section 232 policy.
Taiwan’s government is pushing back on that narrative. Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs Chin-tsang Ho has made it clear that overseas expansion is not a giveaway, but a growth requirement for a company that now operates at the very top tier of global industry. In today’s semiconductor economy, Ho argued, leveraging international resources and talent isn’t optional anymore—it’s essential if TSMC wants to keep scaling while staying close to customers worldwide.
That message was reinforced during a January 26, 2026 session of the Legislative Yuan’s Finance Committee, where central bank officials and finance ministry leaders also addressed how the trade agreement could influence Taiwan’s financial system, industrial strategy, jobs outlook, and market stability. The direction being outlined isn’t simply about one company building more fabs abroad—it’s about a longer-term reshaping of where advanced chips are made and how the global tech supply chain is organized.
According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the US and Taiwan are positioned to dominate next-generation manufacturing. Projections show the two sides could account for virtually all sub-5nm capacity split primarily in Taiwan—an estimated 85% in Taiwan versus 15% in the US by 2030, shifting to 80% versus 20% by 2036. Under this vision, Taiwan strengthens its role as the leading semiconductor and AI manufacturing hub, while the United States becomes the top center for AI applications. The partnership, in other words, isn’t framed as Taiwan losing its edge—it’s presented as Taiwan extending its influence across the most valuable parts of the technology stack.
Ho emphasized that Taiwan remains central to TSMC’s technical performance, pointing to the company’s top-tier yield rates at home. But he also stressed the realities of being a global giant: continued growth requires proximity to overseas customers, access to local workforces, and the ability to integrate with regional resources and infrastructure. For TSMC, building internationally is as much about meeting demand and ensuring resilience as it is about capacity.
Another key theme emerging from the government’s comments is supply chain restructuring. National Development Council Deputy Minister Shien-quey Kao described the current moment as a second wave of global supply chain reordering, with Taiwan working to secure what he referred to as a “Taiwan model” for entering and operating within the US supply chain. In practical terms, Kao said the US has committed concrete support measures for Taiwanese companies investing in semiconductors and ICT—covering access to land, utilities, infrastructure coordination, tax incentives, and visa programs. For businesses weighing large-scale investment decisions, these details matter because they lower friction and reduce uncertainty.
Still, the political pressure point remains talent. Hsinchu County legislator Szu-ming Lin raised the concern directly: if experienced semiconductor engineers in Hsinchu are assigned to US operations, could Taiwan’s domestic ecosystem suffer?
Kao’s answer was that global expansion is being driven by customer demand, not politics—and the customer map is clear. Around 74% of TSMC’s customers are in North America, making an international footprint a practical necessity. He also argued the benefits can cycle back into Taiwan: profits from overseas operations can support higher capital expenditure at home, while core research and development personnel remain Taiwan-based. The message from officials is that relocation will be partial and targeted rather than a wholesale shift of Taiwan’s semiconductor brainpower.
Kao also framed the broader strategy as cooperation with democratic partners across critical industries, including energy, semiconductors, AI, ICT, quantum technology, drones, smart robotics, and other strategic tech categories. The goal is to establish resilient supply chains that do not depend on China—an idea that is increasingly shaping industrial policy and investment planning across the world.
For Taiwan’s wider economy, the government’s stance is that this isn’t only a big-company story. Officials point to spillover effects where major firms help smaller suppliers and service providers expand internationally, giving Taiwan’s small and medium-sized businesses a clearer runway into global markets.
Markets, at least for now, appear to like the direction. Officials said trade uncertainty has dropped significantly, and Taiwan’s strategic economic partnership with the United States is viewed as increasingly secure. Taiwan’s established strengths in high tech are expected to consolidate further, while traditional industries may see new opportunities to modernize and rebound through improved trade conditions and investment momentum.
The shift in sentiment has shown up in economic forecasts. Global investment firms including Nomura, UBS, and DBS have raised their projections for Taiwan’s 2026 GDP growth, placing estimates in the 4.4% to 4.8% range. Whether the political debate over talent relocation intensifies or cools, the current trajectory signals one thing clearly: Taiwan is positioning itself not just to keep its semiconductor leadership, but to anchor it more deeply in a new US–Taiwan technology partnership that could reshape advanced chipmaking for the next decade.
