Samsung and SK hynix May Turn to Chinese Chip Equipment as US Export Rules Tighten
Samsung and SK hynix are reportedly weighing a major supply chain shift that could reshape how their China-based memory chip factories operate in the years ahead. As Washington continues to tighten export controls on semiconductor technology, the two South Korean chip giants are said to be evaluating equipment from Chinese supplier Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment, better known as AMEC.
The move highlights a growing reality in the global semiconductor industry: companies with major operations in China are looking for ways to protect their production lines from sudden policy changes, licensing delays, and geopolitical disruption.
AMEC, one of China’s most important semiconductor equipment makers, produces etching tools used in chip manufacturing. These tools are reportedly priced around 20% to 30% lower than comparable Western-made equipment, making them attractive not only from a strategic standpoint but also from a cost perspective.
For Samsung and SK hynix, the appeal is clear. If future US restrictions prevent them from bringing advanced Western chipmaking tools into China, having Chinese-made alternatives already tested or approved could help keep their fabs running.
Samsung operates a major NAND flash memory production facility in Xi’an, China. SK hynix, meanwhile, runs NAND operations in Dalian and a DRAM memory chip plant in Wuxi. These facilities are vital parts of the global memory supply chain, producing chips used in smartphones, servers, laptops, data centers, and consumer electronics.
Both companies have publicly denied that they are testing AMEC equipment. However, the broader industry context makes the possibility difficult to ignore. Semiconductor manufacturers are under mounting pressure to diversify their equipment sources as the US and China continue to move further apart on technology policy.
The issue became more urgent after the US Commerce Department changed its approach to Samsung and SK hynix’s China-based operations. In 2023, their Chinese fabs were granted Validated End User status, allowing them to receive certain US-origin chipmaking tools without needing repeated individual approvals. That designation was later revoked, replaced by an annual licensing system currently valid only through 2026.
This creates uncertainty for long-term factory planning. Semiconductor fabs depend on highly specialized equipment, regular upgrades, spare parts, and maintenance support. Even short interruptions can affect production efficiency, capacity expansion, and competitiveness. As a result, chipmakers with facilities in China may increasingly seek equipment suppliers that are less exposed to US export licensing rules.
At the same time, Washington is reportedly considering additional restrictions on Chinese technology products. One area under review is China-made optical transceivers, components used in fiber optic communications. These devices convert electrical signals into light for transmission through fiber cables, then convert the light back into electrical signals at the receiving end. They are essential for telecom networks, data centers, and high-speed internet infrastructure.
The Trump administration is also preparing measures aimed at Chinese polysilicon and related products. Polysilicon is a crucial material used to manufacture solar panels and silicon wafers. Proposed actions may include a minimum import price combined with tariffs, based on national security findings under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
The stated goal is to protect US polysilicon producers from China’s heavily subsidized production capacity and its dominance in the global market. Companies such as Hemlock Semiconductor and Wacker Chemie’s US operations could benefit from stronger trade protections.
Yet these policies may also create unintended consequences. By limiting access to Western equipment and materials, the US could accelerate demand for Chinese alternatives. If Samsung and SK hynix begin adopting AMEC tools in their China fabs, it would strengthen China’s domestic semiconductor equipment ecosystem and potentially increase AMEC’s credibility with major global customers.
That would be an ironic outcome for a policy designed to reduce dependence on China. Instead of weakening China’s role in critical supply chains, tougher export controls may push multinational companies to localize more of their operations inside China using Chinese suppliers.
The semiconductor industry is already moving toward a more fragmented global structure. The US, China, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Europe are all investing heavily in chip production, equipment, materials, and supply chain security. But the more governments intervene, the more companies must adapt by building parallel sourcing strategies.
For Samsung and SK hynix, the priority is not politics but continuity. Their China fabs represent massive investments and remain important to global memory chip supply. If Chinese-made equipment helps reduce operational risk, it may become a practical option, even if it comes with diplomatic sensitivity.
The bigger story is that US-China technology tensions are no longer affecting only Chinese companies. They are forcing some of the world’s largest chipmakers to rethink how they source equipment, where they build capacity, and how they prepare for future restrictions.
If AMEC gains a foothold in major foreign-operated fabs in China, it could mark a significant step forward for China’s semiconductor ambitions. It would also show how export controls, tariffs, and trade barriers can sometimes reshape global supply chains in unexpected ways.
